Presidential Control on Bureaucracy and Interagency Coordination in the United States

Mr. Takaharu Saito
Language
English
Abstract

How does the U.S. president achieve control on the bureaucracy and implement policies which he prefers? In the literature, the scholars explained several mechanisms with various methods such as executive order and regulatory review. However, the reasons that the bureaucratic officers comply with the president’s directives and implement the policies the president wants are insufficiently explained. This study examines interagency coordination in bureaucratic rulemaking process as a mechanism of the presidential control of the bureaucracy with a unique dataset detecting rulemaking in interagency framework across 17 government agencies based on text analysis method, and the results indicate that the president selects agencies which are in ideological agreement with the president for agency as a leader in interagency framework. This project represents among the first quantitative empirical assessments of the utility of interagency coordination in rulemaking process.